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C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 001995

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DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG  
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON  
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2017  
TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [KPKO](#) [UN](#) [AU](#) [SU](#)  
SUBJECT: CHIEF MEDIATOR RIEK MACHAR ON LORD'S RESISTANCE  
ARMY

Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (SBU) Senior Adviser to Assistant Secretary Frazer for Conflict Resolution Tim Shortley met briefly with GOSS Vice President and Chief Mediator Riek Machar before the opening of a Human Rights Day ceremony at the Juba National stadium on December 10. Machar opened the meeting by stating that he would travel to Rikwamba on December 15-16 with President Chissano and the LRA delegation to meeting with Kony to discuss next steps in the peace process and to verify whether Otti is truly dead or alive. Machar believes that if Otti is alive, Kony must bring him to Rikwamba. If he does not bring Otti to Rikwangba, they will assume that he is dead.

¶2. (ABU) Machar would not confirm if he thinks Otti is dead, but with a smile on his face indicated that events on October 2 likely resulted in his demise. Alive or dead, Machar said that the peace talks must continue. Machar also said that if Otti is dead, he will press Kony to explain that he had to kill Otti because he stood in the way of peace. Machar stressed that if Kony did not say this, he will lose significant LRA support.

¶3. (SBU) Shortley said that the LRA delegation may try to bring other political issues to the Juba peace talks that have nothing to do with the insurgency and should not be entertained (e.g., a Federal State, election reform, etc.). Machar responded that only the agreed items listed in Agenda #2 could be considered by the parties. Machar noted that the real problem continues to be money and accounting for money. He asked that the U.S. should provide additional funds to support the peace process. Shortley stressed that the U.S. just provided \$330,000 to support President Chissano's office and the African observers, and \$1.7 million for demobilization. Shortley underscored that the Europeans need to provide more for the consultations if it is needed.

¶4. (SBU) Machar stated that the Juba peace talks would resume o/a January 15. This would be preceded by a five day consultation period in Rikwangba from January 5 to 10 and provide an additional number of days in Juba to finalize the report. Shortley noted that bringing the process right up against the end of the Cessation of Hostilities was risky and that everyone agreed the process must be limited. Machar asked for U.S. patience and explained that he never thought peace talks would even bring us this far. He laughed saying, "I never thought that the Government of Uganda would ever agree to allow the LRA delegation to tour Uganda and discuss accountability and reconciliation with the people of Uganda, but they did." He exclaimed, "this was a major

confidence builder that must be continued through the consultations in Rikwangba."

¶5. (SBU) Machar closed the meeting by stating that the LRA delegation has done the best that they could have done under difficult circumstances. He also said that Kony seems prepared for a fair trial under a mixed Uganda judicial process that includes national and traditional systems. Machar joked that it is necessary to "give the devil a fair trial."

¶6. (C) COMMENT: Shortley purposely did not reveal the most recent information made available by the defections for fear that Machar would inform LRA leader Kony or others. While Machar also did not provide new information to Shortley, Machar noted several times that he does not have the latest information on the current situation in Garamba and discussions between Kony and the LRA delegation, and was in fact ill-informed on the latest information regarding defectors. Although the meeting with Vice President Machar was brief, it was helpful to meet with him in advance of the arrival of President Chissano and the LRA delegation and their trip to Rikwangba this coming weekend. The visit reinforced the messages highlighted by Assistant Secretary Frazer in early September: the U.S. would like to see a peaceful end to the conflict, but the process must not be open-ended, and contingencies must be planned if the LRA does not agree to a peaceful conclusion to the conflict. End comment.  
FERNANDEZ